How Bookmakers Used "Safety" to Cull Their Profitable Customers—and Why Racing Let Them

£3 billion in betting turnover has vanished. Monthly figures down 15-20% year-on-year. The Horserace Betting Levy Board—a public body—refuses to publish quarterly data for Q2 2025, citing "commercial sensitivity." Which commercial interests exactly? Not racing's.

Here's what the numbers reveal: affordability checks weren't designed to identify problem gamblers. They were designed to eliminate profitable customers under regulatory cover. And racing's governing bodies helped.

The Data Nobody Will Publish

Total betting turnover fell 6.8% in 2024 versus 2023, and 16.5% versus 2022. Adjusted for inflation, the shortfall approaches £11.5 billion. Average race turnover down 4% despite running more races—more product, less money.

The Racing Post's Big Punting Survey: 23.7% of respondents underwent checks in 2025, up from 16.6% in 2023. But here's the targeting: 75% of those betting £1,000+ were checked. Over half betting £100+. Even 20% of those averaging £10 stakes.

Black market usage increased from 3.6% to 4.9%, with separate analysis suggesting a 522% jump in customers using unlicensed operators over three years.

The question nobody answers: what percentage of lost turnover came from customers betting £500+ monthly? If 20% of customers generate 80% of turnover (conservative for gambling), and checks eliminated a significant portion of that 20%, the £3bn hole makes perfect sense.

The HBLB won't publish this data. The Horserace Betting Levy Board—a statutory public body—refuses to publish all the quarterly or monthly turnover figures, citing "commercial sensitivity." Which commercial interests are being protected when racing bleeds £3 billion? Not racing's. The opacity serves only regulators who can claim they need "more data" whilst the patient dies. Racing after all depends on levy which is driven by profits, which now amounts to anything working against bettors.

Here's the exquisite hypocrisy: BHA leadership regularly bangs on about transparency and accountability. Brant Dunshea talks about "making sure that racing's position is fully understood by government." Julie Harrington spoke of "being transparent about the challenges we face." But the sport is anything but transparent in its decision making or how it operates with its customers and stakeholders.

Yet the HBLB hides the lifeblood of racing's finances behind commercial confidentiality clauses. The very data that would demonstrate the velocity of racing's collapse, that would show which customer segments are being eliminated, that would prove affordability checks are destroying the sport's economic model—buried.

You can't demand government transparency about regulatory impact whilst refusing to publish the turnover data that measures that impact. Unless, of course, publishing the data would make the damage so undeniable that someone might have to do something about it.

The industry won't publish customer segmentation data either. Because the answers would show these checks didn't target harm—they destroyed racing's economic model by culling high-value customers whilst leaving small-stakes recreational punters largely untouched, in other words the "mugs".

Why Bookmakers Volunteered to Restrict Their Customers

They didn't restrict them. They upgraded them.

For years, bookmakers complained privately about "sharp" customers—punters who study form, identify value, and win consistently. Traditionally restricting winners generated terrible PR: "Bookies ban winners!" Politicians asked questions. It looked exactly like what it was.

Affordability checks solved this elegantly. Now you restrict accounts for "financial risk." The customer who carefully stakes £200-300 monthly, studies form, and wins 55% of their bets? Previously they'd face restriction and make noise. Now they hit the £150 monthly threshold and discover their account limited before they've done anything noteworthy. Bank statements and intrusive checks now are there to mine data, no reasons,no names, no fecking packdrill, nothing safe in providing unsecured data.

The Betting and Gaming Council developed its voluntary Code on Customer Checks in cooperation with regulators. They volunteered to design the restrictions. Why? Compare the customers:

Racing customer being eliminated: Studies form for hours, compares odds, bets selectively, might win 52-55%, generates customer service overhead. Pattern: £200-500 monthly on carefully selected races.

Casino customer being retained: Opens app when bored, plays algorithmic games, no skill needed, house edge guaranteed, low overhead. Pattern: £50-200 weekly, rapid repeated stakes.

Every racing customer who migrates to slots is a margin upgrade. Casino products face 21% tax but no levy. Racing faces 15% tax plus 10% levy—25% total take—with external dependencies and high-maintenance customers.

The BGC didn't facilitate revenue loss. They facilitated customer quality improvement.

The Generational Destruction Nobody Mentions

Racing needed those knowledgeable customers for reasons beyond immediate turnover. Sports grow through generational transfer—experienced participants introduce newcomers. Your father takes you to Newmarket. Your colleague explains the form. Your friend brings you to Cheltenham, Kelso or Plumpton.

The £200-500 monthly bettors being systematically eliminated weren't just revenue—they were racing's organic growth mechanism. These were the customers who bought Racing Post subscriptions, attended race meetings, discussed horses in pubs, and introduced others to the sport.

You don't build the next generation of racing fans from casino players hitting slots at 2am. You build it from engaged customers who understand the sport well enough to explain why it matters. Affordability checks have eliminated precisely the cohort that creates new racing fans, those few that made a profit that generate hope and aspiration. But the very bodies like the HBLB are complicit in killing it.

The checks don't just destroy current revenue—they've severed racing's ability to generate future customers. In ten years, racing will discover it's not just smaller. It's older, less engaged, and has no pipeline of knowledgeable fans to replace those aging out.

This was obvious. Nobody with power cared enough to prevent it.

The 80% Problem: Racing's Fatal Dependency

British horseracing derives approximately 80% of funding from bookmakers through three channels: the Horserace Betting Levy (£108m in 2024/25), media rights, and sponsorship. Combined: roughly £384 million annually.

This creates a hostage situation. Racing cannot meaningfully oppose bookmaker interests without risking collapse. When affordability checks were proposed, racing faced an impossible choice: oppose aggressively and risk antagonising the source of 80% of funding, or collaborate and hope bookmakers' self-interest would drive opposition.

Racing chose collaboration. Bookmakers chose casino margins.

The death spiral is mathematical: Reduced turnover → lower levy → worse prize money → less competitive racing → smaller fields → further turnover decline → reduced media rights → cut sponsorship. Meanwhile, bookmakers shift marketing spend to casino products where checks are less impactful.

Racing tied 80% of its funding to an industry that discovered it didn't need racing anymore. This isn't betrayal—it's predictable economics.

The Grainne Hurst Problem

In September 2024, as racing's crisis deepened, the BGC appointed Grainne Hurst as CEO. Her credentials? Nearly ten years at Entain, where she "created and delivered Entain's multi award winning global safer gambling strategy, Changing for the Bettor."

Let that land. Racing's fate now rests with a trade body led by someone who designed the affordability architecture killing the sport.

In her first statement, Hurst committed to "delivering and implementing the outstanding proposals outlined in last year's White Paper," including "online financial risk checks carefully targeted on those at risk." The data shows 75% of £1,000+ bettors were checked. That's not targeting—that's industrial-scale elimination.

Where was Hurst's voice when racing lost £3 billion? Nowhere. But in June 2025, she warned tax harmonisation "would be pretty catastrophic for the horse racing industry." Suddenly vocal. The difference: tax harmonisation affects casino margins equally. Affordability checks primarily hurt racing.

Hurst didn't let the industry down. She was never going to defend racing because her career was built designing the systems destroying it. The BGC appointing her was racing accepting managed decline whilst calling it leadership.

The Racing Media's Complicity

The Racing Post continues publishing "intelligent betting strategies" and "value identification" guides. Every piece is functionally useless for anyone who applies it successfully. Follow the advice effectively enough to bet £200+ monthly? You'll be flagged and restricted within months.

The racing media won't acknowledge this because their revenue model—subscriptions, operator advertising, affiliate commissions—depends on maintaining the fantasy that intelligent betting remains viable. Not one major publication has seriously investigated Hurst's appointment or demanded the customer segmentation data or HBLB quarterly figures.

Why? Their advertising revenue comes from bookmakers implementing the restrictions. Affiliate deals depend on signing up customers who don't yet know the game is rigged. The racing media profits from pretending the system still works. Dont ask tough questions or we cut your funding!

The Three Futures (All Grim)

Scenario One: No Tax Carve-Out

Year 1: £66-160m revenue hit, 3,700+ jobs lost, prize money collapses 15-25%. Years 2-5: cumulative £330m loss compounds the £250m affordability damage. Total: £580m. Bloodstock migration accelerates. Training centres contract. By 2030: ~1,000-1,100 fixtures annually (down from 1,460), £200-230m in bookmaker funding, 50,000 jobs (down from 85,000).

Scenario Two: Carve-Out Secured, Current Levy Rate

Year 1: Racing avoids immediate tax hit. BHA declares victory. But affordability checks remain fully operational. Years 2-5: turnover bleeds 5-8% annually as checks embed. High-value customers continue leaving. Each year another cohort hits rolling annual thresholds. By 2030: ~1,200 fixtures, £250-280m in bookmaker funding, 60,000 jobs.

Scenario Three: Levy Increase Secured

Racing persuades government to increase the levy from 10% to 15-20% of gross profits to offset turnover decline. Sounds like victory. Here's what actually happens:

Bookmakers respond rationally: if forced to pay more in statutory levy, they reduce voluntary payments. Media rights negotiations turn hostile—"You just took an extra £30-40m in levy; we're adjusting media payments accordingly." Sponsorship gets cut—"Our racing cost base just increased; something has to give."

The mathematical reality: £40m extra levy generates perhaps £25-30m net after bookmakers reduce other payments. But the pain isn't distributed evenly. Margins fall with reduced liquidity.

Premier fixtures—Cheltenham, Royal Ascot, the Grand National—retain media value and sponsorship because they drive betting volume bookmakers can't replicate elsewhere. These showcase events survive, possibly even maintain funding.

Core and standard fixtures get eviscerated. These are the racecourses that depend most heavily on the voluntary payments being cut. Ludlow, Hexham, Market Rasen—the courses that employ most of racing's workforce, that provide the breeding ground for future champions, that sustain rural communities.

The middle dies. Racing becomes a tale of two industries: prestigious festival racing that survives on heritage appeal, and a hollowed-out fixture list where prize money collapses, field sizes shrink to uncompetitive levels, and racecourses operate on financial life support. High volume low quality racing is maintained with reduced prize money.

By 2030 under this scenario: 1,150-1,250 fixtures (the cuts come from Core/Standard fixtures), £240-270m total funding, but distributed wildly unevenly. The 50-60 premium fixtures take 60-70% of available money. The remaining 1,100+ fixtures fight over scraps. Perhaps 55,000-58,000 jobs—the losses concentrated in smaller racing centres.

The three scenarios converge: Different routes, similar destination. A substantially smaller British horseracing industry operating at 60-70% of 2022 scale by 2030. The carve-out and levy negotiations determine distribution of pain, not whether pain occurs.

Racing is negotiating over which parts of itself to amputate, not whether to remain whole.

What Racing Needs (But Won't Get)

Removal or fundamental reform of affordability checks. Won't happen—regulatory architecture is built. Revenue diversification beyond bookmakers. Should have happened 20 years ago. Levy reform. Government promised in 2023; delivered nothing. Customer re-acquisition strategy. Racing has no plan.

The carve-out is fighting for a 6 percentage point tax differential whilst customer restrictions cause 5-8% annual turnover decline. Racing is optimising deck chair placement.

The Uncomfortable Conclusion

The checks aren't calibrated to identify harm. They're calibrated to identify competence. Racing's most knowledgeable customers—the ones who study form, understand value, create market liquidity through informed betting—are being systematically eliminated under the banner of social responsibility.

The major bookmakers volunteered to design these restrictions. The BGC, now led by the woman who designed Entain's affordability strategy, implemented them cooperatively. The BHA initially welcomed regulatory reform before belatedly recognising the threat—too late. The HBLB refuses to publish all the data showing the velocity of decline. The racing media maintains the fantasy that intelligent punting still exists because their business model depends on it, and no one want to declare they are in trouble.

Racing tied 80% of its funding to an industry with more profitable alternatives. When regulatory pressure arrived, bookmakers did the obvious: eliminated high-maintenance customers under regulatory cover whilst pivoting to algorithmic casino products with better margins.

The affordability checks didn't destroy UK horseracing. They revealed that racing had already destroyed itself by choosing dependency over diversification, by building an economic model that required bookmaker goodwill to function. When that goodwill expired—predictably—racing discovered it had no leverage, no alternative revenue, and governing bodies that mistook collaboration for strategy.

Whether racing secures its tax carve-out or not, both futures lead to a substantially smaller industry. The weapons of racing's destruction were handed to regulators by bookmakers who'd already moved on, facilitated by governing bodies that chose compliance over confrontation.

The £3 billion isn't coming back. The customers are gone—restricted, migrated to casino products, or driven to black market operators. The checks have achieved exactly what they were designed to achieve: eliminate informed customers whilst maintaining the appearance of social responsibility and concern.

Racing built this future for itself. Now it gets to live in it.