Can the British Horseracing Authority Objectively Regulate Its Owners? The Structural Conflict at the Heart of British Racing

A £500 Fine and the Question Racing Won't Ask

When James Sanderson admitted to deliberately falsifying GoingStick readings—recording 7.6 when the actual measurement was 8.6—and claimed over 50% of his colleagues do likewise, the penalty was £500. He had confessed to providing false data affecting multi-million-pound betting and entry decisions. Yet he remains in post, Thirsk continues racing, and the systematic corruption of official data goes largely unaddressed. This requires examining whether British racing's regulatory structure—where the Racecourse Association owns 50% of the regulator—creates an insurmountable conflict that undermines the sport's integrity.

The Ownership Question: Who Controls the BHA?

The BHA operates as a company limited by guarantee with four guarantors, but the distribution of power tells the real story: the Racecourse Association holds 3 shares, whilst the ROA, licensees, and TBA hold 1 share each. The RCA controls 50% of voting power within the regulator's governance structure, plus guaranteed board representation. Amendments to the BHA's governing documents require unanimous support from all guarantors—giving the RCA effective veto power over fundamental changes to how the regulator operates. This isn't theoretical influence; it's structural control of the organisation meant to regulate racecourses and an entire industry.

The Sanderson Case: A Study in Regulatory Asymmetry

Sanderson's April 2025 Barstewards podcast admission was remarkable for its candour: "If we published the readings as they came out of the ground they would be misleading... I'd be amazed if you didn't get 50 per cent or more saying yes [to manipulating readings]. I know others do, I talk to them." His December 2025 £500 fine followed an admission of systematically falsifying data that influences betting markets worth billions, affects trainers' decisions, impacts owners' entries, and suggests widespread industry malpractice.

Adjudicating panel member Philippa Charles acknowledged Sanderson regarded the GoingStick as "flawed and inferior to his experienced view," but crucially noted: "it is nevertheless the case that it is a requirement of BHA that it be used, and a requirement of the rules that the data generated by it is returned faithfully to the BHA." Regardless of his views on equipment effectiveness, Sanderson knowingly broke mandatory rules. His fine amounts to less than a decent London dinner. There was no reference to the repeated failures to provide readings over the years. There was no investigation reported that the more damaging allegation that the misdemeanor was widespred in the industry. So much for the sports integrity?

The Comparative Analysis: When Participants Break the Rules

To understand whether this represents proportionate justice, we must examine how the BHA treats other rule-breakers who lack the RCA's structural protection.

Trainers: Eight Years for Steroids

Mahmood Al Zarooni received an eight-year ban in April 2013 after 15 horses tested positive for anabolic steroids. The BHA's penalty guidelines allow fines up to £75,000 for Disciplinary Panel matters, with racecourse stewards empowered to impose up to £15,000. For Rule C45.4 breaches—failing to ensure horses are ridden on their merits—trainers face £5,000-£30,000 fines with a £7,500 entry point.

Jockeys: 28 Days for an Honest Mistake

Mark Crehan's case exemplifies both the severity of jockey penalties and the terrible optics of regulatory asymmetry. In July 2021, the 23-year-old apprentice—second in the champion apprentice standings with 18 winners—made a split-second error at Doncaster. Riding Aerion Power for Sir Michael Stoute, he mistook the half-furlong marker for the winning post and eased down, allowing Colony Queen to snatch victory.

His punishment: 28 days banned from July 31 to August 27, costing an estimated £7,500 in lost earnings during his breakout season.

The optics are devastating for the BHA's credibility. In the same month, trainer William Haggas received a £1,000 fine for entering the wrong horse, whilst Aidan O'Brien's yard was fined £4,000 for similar administrative errors. A young jockey's honest mistake—the kind many riders have made—warranted a month-long suspension. Trainers' administrative failures merited token fines barely registering against substantial operations.

For whip violations, jockeys face escalating suspensions directly impacting their livelihoods—days they cannot work, opportunities lost, momentum broken. Sean Levey received a 26-day ban (18 days to serve) in November 2025, with Judicial Panel member Clement Goldstone KC warning that future violations could result in "longer periods of suspension," calling his explanation "very hollow and unattractive."

The message is clear: participants face career-damaging consequences; racecourse officials receive token fines.

The £500 Answer and Catastrophic Optics

Against this backdrop, Sanderson's £500 fine represents:

• 6.7% of the £7,500 entry point for trainers failing in their duties

• Less than 3.5% of the maximum fine racecourse stewards can impose

• Seventeen times less than Mark Crehan's lost income from his 28-day ban

From a public confidence perspective, this is regulatory disaster. Crehan made a split-second error in competition—the kind that happens occasionally despite best efforts. Sanderson deliberately falsified official data over an extended period, admitted half his colleagues do likewise, and showed no contrition beyond practical concerns about equipment accuracy.

The optics worsen when considering racecourse ownership of the regulator. The BHA cannot credibly claim objectivity when racecourses control 50% of its voting power, a racecourse official systematically breaks rules affecting billions in betting, the penalty is derisory compared to participant sanctions, and the official remains in post whilst the systematic problem goes unaddressed.

This isn't about individual BHA staff integrity—it's about a structure that makes objective regulation impossible and creates devastating public perception problems. When punters see different rules applied based on who transgresses rather than what they've done, trust in racing's integrity evaporates.

The Two-Tier System: Evidence Beyond Sanderson

In April 2025, the Racing Post exposed shocking weighing room conditions: damp and mould, dangerous equipment placement, jockeys exercising next to urinals at Bangor, inadequate facilities for female jockeys. The weighing room programme announced in November 2021 with an October 2024 deadline saw only 12 of 59 racecourses complete on time. The BHA's response was extensions to July 2025, December 2027, and December 2030 (later 2027). Compare this with jockey or trainer treatment. A jockey missing weight faces immediate consequences. A trainer with substandard facilities risks licence conditions. Yet racecourses operate for years below agreed standards whilst the BHA expresses "understanding" about "financial headwinds."

The Structural Impossibility and Bad Optics

The question isn't whether BHA individuals are well-intentioned—they are. It's whether the structure makes objective regulation impossible whilst creating appalling optics that undermine public trust.

When the RCA controls 50% of voting power, has guaranteed board representation, and holds veto power over governance changes, the regulator cannot treat racecourse transgressions with the same severity it applies to participants. The evidence mounts:

• Financial Penalties: Racecourse officials like Sanderson receive token fines whilst participants face career-damaging sanctions

• Facility Standards: Racecourses receive multi-year extensions; trainers would face immediate licence issues

• Accountability: Sanderson's admission of widespread malpractice generates individual investigation, not systematic reform

• Enforcement: Licence conditions for racecourses are negotiated, not imposed

The optics are catastrophic. To anyone observing from outside—punters, media, government—this looks exactly like what it is: an industry where those who own the regulator receive lenient treatment whilst those without ownership face strict enforcement. This perception, whether fully fair or not, is devastating for racing's credibility and integrity claims.

The Integrity Question and Public Perception

British racing prides itself on integrity standards, yet this work exists within a structure that fundamentally compromises independence. Sanderson's admission strikes at the heart of trust—punters rely on accurate data, trainers on honest going reports, owners on truthful conditions. The BHA's response suggests different rules apply based on whether the transgressor is a racecourse official or participant.

From a public relations perspective, this is indefensible. Racing asks punters to trust its integrity whilst demonstrating that those who own the regulator face minimal consequences for systematic rule-breaking. The industry cannot simultaneously claim robust integrity standards and defend a governance structure where regulators answer to those they regulate.

British racing is a web of dependencies. Challenging the power structure risks ostracism. Easier to accept the two-tier system than demand structural change. Some racecourse officials even defended Sanderson, with Kelso's Jonathan Garratt suggesting manipulated readings helped provide clearer information—regulatory capture expressed with remarkable candour.

Does British Racing Need Revolutionising?

The Sanderson case and weighing room scandal are symptoms of a far deeper malaise. British racing faces an existential crisis that extends well beyond regulatory capture—a crisis of governance, funding, competitiveness, and structural viability that demands revolutionary change rather than incremental tinkering.

The Bleeding Numbers

Field sizes peaked at 12 runners per race in 2000, now average nine or ten, with PwC projecting 7.1 by 2030—making much of the fixture list unviable. The foal crop could fall 25% by 2026. Racing betting turnover declined 16.3% over two years versus 7% for football. PwC warned losses "call into question the sustainability of the British breeding industry."

Britain increased fixtures 60% since 2000; Australia thrived by cutting 18%. One model rewards efficiency; the other leans on volume and mediocrity.

The Governance Paralysis

At racing's crisis heart sits the Sanderson problem writ large: a governing body that cannot govern. When Racing Post questioned stakeholders, participants united demanding change whilst racecourses remained silent or ignored questions. Their silence reveals who controls British racing. Lord Charles Allen's delayed appointment symbolised these fractures and the one day a week man is not going to crack it on his own. His reforms—separating regulation from governance, creating independence, giving real teeth—met resistance because they threatened vested interests. Industry analyst Richard Killoran observed: "Successive structures have failed to bring alignment—incentives pull in different directions, and no single authority has the power to steer the sport."

The Australian Contrast and Funding Crisis

Peter V'landys, Racing NSW chief executive: "The funding model is not going to sustain the racing industry... They're going to have to change their corporate governance structure to give someone more teeth, to make decisions for the betterment of the industry as a whole and not vested interests." Australia and the PGA Tour control their destiny—owning media rights, designing schedules, shaping product. In British racing, it's reversed. The BHA has little authority over commercial rights or fixtures. Racecourses control the regulator whilst pursuing their own interests.

The funding crisis compounds governance failure. Racing receives less than 3% of £13bn bet annually—far behind France and Ireland. The sport depends on quantity over quality, creating perverse incentives against fixture reduction. Affordability checks hammered racing disproportionately. Yet fractured governance prevents coordinated response.

Weighing room failures revealed racecourses operating years below agreed safeguarding standards whilst the BHA expressed "understanding." Smaller tracks like Fakenham completed upgrades on time; larger operations received endless extensions. This isn't regulation—it's negotiation between parties with equal power.

The Existential Question

British racing faces a choice: revolutionary restructuring or continued decline. Incremental change—consultations, working groups, reports—won't address problems this profound.

Revolutionary change requires:

1. Genuinely Independent Regulation: BHA restructured as independent statutory authority, funded by levies but not controlled by commercial interests

2. Centralised Commercial Control: Governing body controls media rights, fixtures, product development

3. Radical Fixture Reduction: Cut fixtures 30%, concentrating on quality over quantity

4. Reformed Funding Model: Genuine share of bookmaker tax revenues, not token percentages

5. Transparent Governance: Appointments based on expertise, not stakeholder representation

6. Unified Disciplinary Standards: Equivalent scrutiny and penalties for all participants regardless of status

These reforms require political will that doesn't exist. They need legislative intervention and powerful interests ceding control. The alternative is continued managed decline: smaller fields, fewer horses, collapsing attendance, diminishing betting, gradual relegation from major sport to niche entertainment.

Conclusion: The £500 Answer

James Sanderson's £500 fine is not an anomaly—it's the system working as designed. When a regulator is half-owned by those it regulates, when racecourses hold veto power over governance changes, differential treatment based on who transgresses is inevitable.

The question—can a regulator objectively regulate its owners?—has a clear answer: no. The Sanderson case, weighing room scandal, and years of asymmetric enforcement demonstrate the BHA cannot objectively regulate racecourses because racecourses control its governance.

The optics are catastrophic for racing's credibility. To external observers—punters, media, government, potential fans—this looks exactly like regulatory capture. That perception, regardless of individual BHA staff integrity, is devastating for a sport claiming robust integrity standards. This isn't about criticising individuals working within an impossible structure. It's about recognising regulatory capture isn't a bug—it's a feature. Until racing creates genuinely independent regulation, integrity claims will remain undermined by structural reality.

The sport deserves better. Punters deserve better. The thousands of trainers, jockeys, owners, and stable staff who follow the rules whilst watching racecourse officials receive token penalties for systematic data falsification certainly deserve better.James Sanderson's £500 fine speaks volumes—just not the message British racing wants to hear. When you own your regulator, you make your own rules. And everyone can see it.